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This paper analyzes plea bargaining and plea negotiation in
the American judicial system. Plea bargaining refers to informal
negotiations leading to an agreement under which the accused enters
a plea of guilty in exchange for a reduced charge or favorable
sentence recommendation by, the prosecutor in criminal court cases.
This type of plea negotiation is not recognized in the legal
statutes and operates by a subsystem of "invisible" controls.
Plea bargaining is a permanent fixture in our legal system to the
extent that at present, the courts cannot operate without it.
Studies are a~alyzed which reveal that seventy-five percent
~nd perhaps as many as ninety-five percent of all criminal cases
do not go to a jury trial, and a substantial number of these
cases involve a negotiated bargain.
Four types of bargaining or negotiation are discussed. These
usually involve bargaining to reduce a sentence; to show leniency
in sentencing; to settle for a lesser charge or one charge for a
variety of offenses; or to drop charges entirely.
Contrary to popula~ belief, plea bargaining has become
ingrained in our legal system because offenders and agencies
such as police departments, prosecutor's offices, and the courts
benefit from its use. It can be efficient, time saving and less
risky to the parties involved. Specific benefits to the offender,
prosecution, defense, and judges are mentioned. It is also noted,
however, that the accused may fare better in a jury trial.
Arguments for and against plea bargaining are presented.
Key elements of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice (Task Force Report: The Courts)
relating to plea bargaining is reviewed. The conclusion drawn
is that bargain justice has become a necessity in our present
legal system. However, substantial change must occur within
the near future to bring official recognition and cont.roL in
plea bargaining and to protect the rights of those involved.
Introduction
Probably one of the least understood institutions in this country is the
judicial system involving criminal cases. The general public continues to assume
that the criminal offender proceeds through the court system in the typical Perry
Mason fashion with the guilty meeting his fate at the hands of a competent jury.
This, in fact, is not the case. For example, most offenders do not go through a
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jury trial at all as we shall further illustrate.
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One of the major reasons for judicial procedure differing from that generally
expected by the public is the functioning of a subsystem of somewhat "invisible"
controls. Plea bargaining and negotiation is one of these elements that has a
vast influence on the system, and upon which the judicial system has come to .rely.
In the official statutes, however, plea bargaining is not recognized. It has
gradually ingrained itself into court procedure, and now because of expediency,
remains a permanent fixture.
In brief, plea bargaining refers to informal negotiations "looking toward an
agreement under which the accused will enter a plea of guilty in exchange for a
reduced charge or a favorable sentence recommendation by the prosecutor" (Task
Force Report, 1967:9). This can be accomplished by a brief conversation in the
hallway of the courthouse, or it can be "a series of elaborate conferences over
the course of weeks in which facts are thoroughly discussed and alternatives
carefully explored" (President's Commission, 1968:333). There are always at
least two generalizations that can be made about these negotiations: 1) they
are conducted informally and out of sight, and 2) that the issue in a plea
negotiation always is how much leniency an offender will receive in return for
a guilty plea (President's Commission, 1968:333).
Some persons- have a less favorable name for plea bargaining--"copping out."
This "cop-out," says Harold Garfinkel, is "a successful degradation ceremony
which reasserts ultimate social values and strips the accused of his former status."
Essentially, this is a process in which the individual
... is recast in a manner acceptable to all participants,
including potentially the accused himself, the cop-out
cermony in which the accused publicly acknowledges his
guilt and pleads guilty to a lesser charge results in
many less valuable consequences. In part, the cop-out
is a charade in which the accused projects a suitable
degree of guilt, penitence, and remorse, meeting the
suitable minimum standards for such responses expected
by the prosecution, defense, and court, which ultimately
decides the future life of the offender (Knudten, 1970:
445-446).
In the remaining sections of this paper, we shall deal with the following four
aspects of plea bargaining: 1) How much plea bargaining takes place, 2) What are
the forms and processes used, 3) Whobenefits from plea negotiation, and 4) What'
are the arguments for and against the use of plea bargaining in the judicial system.
The Extent of Plea Bargaining
The" most obvious outcome of research into the statistics surrounding plea
bargaining is that it is common; and secondly, most offenders do not go through
a court trial but avoid it by pleading guilty and receiving direct judgment from
the judge.
------------------------_.-d
Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation
Indications are that more than three-fourths of all criminal cases do not go
to a jury trial. In fact, the true figures are most likely closer to ninety
percent; and if misdemeanor offenses are included, ·the percentage is probably
about ninety-five percent (Task Force, 1967:9; ABA Project). Of course, not all
cases that involve a guilty plea are the result of some form of plea negotiation,
but these statistics are overwhelming in light of the traditional'view of how the
courts function.
Below is a table summary of the findings of several studies concerned with
the extent of guilty pleas.
Percent of Guilty Pleas in Various Studies
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Study Percent Pleading Guilty
....
Arthur S. Blumberg (Metropolitan Court, 1950-64) 91-95%a
Dominic R. Vetri (Federal courts, 1956-62) 79%b
Donald J. Newman (Wisconsin county court, 1956) 93.8%c
Jerome H. Skolnick (Federal Courts, 1960-63) 86%d
Abraham S. Blumberg (Large Metropolitan Court, 1962) 87%e
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 73.3-95.5%f
Administration of Justice (9 States and District
of Columbia, 1964)
ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice, 1967 90-95%g
a Blumberg, 1967:29-30.
bVetri, 1964:865.
cdNewman, 1970:173.
Skolnick, 1966:13.
efBlumberg, 1969:279.
Task Force Report.
gABA Project.
While we cannot be certain how many of the above cases did involve plea
bargaining, evidence would seem to show that a large percentage did in fact
include some form of plea negotiation. A University of Pennsylvania Law Review
study which surveyed 205 prosecutors' offices in forty-three states revealed an
estimate of thirty to forty percent of the cases as having resulted from plea
negotiations after the defendant pleaded guilty (Vetri, 1964:896-899). In
Newman's sample, over half (56.7 percent) admitted to plea bargaining (Newman,
1970:179). The President's Commission Report did not even attempt to determine
the percentage of cases that included bargaining. Which again serves to illustrate
the difficulty of dealing with the "invisibility" of plea negotiations. Most
sources, including the President's Commission, do concur that a "substantial"
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number of cases do have the negotiation element present.
a variety of forms.
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These negotiations take
The Process and Forms of Plea Bargaining
Because of the clandestine nature of the negotiated plea, the system usually
operates in an informal and somewhat invisible fashion. Usually the parties in-
volved know what is taking place; but there is no formal recognition that negotiation
is in process, and in some cases, it may even be denied.
As a result there is no judicial review of the propriety
of the bargain--no check on the amount of pressure put
on the defendant to plead guilty. The judge, the public,
and sometimes the defendant himself cannot know for certain
who got what from whom in exchange for what (Task Force~
1967:9).
The cloak of secrecy is beneficial to some of the parties, however, as we
shall discuss later in the paper.
Before and during the negotiation process, both the prosecutor and the defending
attorney must keep in mind that the guilty plea must be voluntary and must be made
with an understanding of the specified charge or charges. If this is not done, the
guilty plea can be withdrawn at any time. Failure to comply with this rule has
usually been held to be a violation of due process (Knudten, 1970:382).
Donald J. Newman has compiled some of the most revealing studies on plea
bargaining. He suggests that there are four general types of considerations
received by offenders in exchange for their guilty plea (1970:178-179).
The first type involves a plea of guilty being entered by the offender in
exchange for a r~duction in the charge brought against him in the complaint.
This is usually done in cases where the statutes allow for varying degrees of
severity related to the same offense, such as in homicide, assault, and sex
offenses. Newman indicates that this form was mentioned as a major issue in
twenty percent of the cases in his study.
The second form is bargaining concerning the sentence. Here the guilty
plea is entered by the accused in exchange for a promise of leniency in the
sentencing. Sometimes the result is probation for the offender, sometimes it
is a less than maximum sentence in a penal institution. Oftentimes, the
arrangement is proposed bluntly in this format: "If you plead guilty to this
new lesser offense, you will get less time in prison than if you plead not
guilty to the original, greater charge and lose the trial" (Sudnow, 1965:257).
Newman found this form to be the most frequently used, occurring in almost half
of the cases studied.
The third type of bargaining is the bargain for concurrent charges. This
form was used most often by offenders who pleaded without counsel. This is
common where numerous charges for the same or related offenses such as larceny
or burglary are filed. The result may be a reduced sentence, but it also may
merely mean serving one sentence for a variety of offenses rather than a more
I
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lengthy procedure. This form was reported in about twenty percent of the cases.
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The last generally used form is the negotiation for dropped charges. Included
here was an agreement on the part of the prosecution to dismiss one or more charges
against the accused if the offender would in turn plead guilty to one offense--
usually the major charge. For example, a charge of theft of a weapon used in armed
robbery might be dropped to obtain a guilty plea to the armed robbery charge. About
thirteen percent of the cases studied used this type of bargaining.
In addition to the above-mentioned plea negotiations, Newman stated that about
thirty-seven percent pleaded guilty, they said, without any type of negotiation.
These processes and forms are used on a cooperative basis by the persons
involved because the parties concerned and the system have benefitted in a variety
of ways by their actions.
Who Benefits from Plea Negotiation?
Contrary to the popular public view of the judicial process, in practice,
police agencies, prosecutors' offices, and the courts operate on the assumption
that most cases will be rapidly disposed of by the use of the guilty plea. Not
only is there an element of time saving and efficiency that is at stake, but
also there is a "risk" factor involved. No matter how well prepared the
attorneys. are and how well the case is conduc ted in court, there is always the
possibility that an unfavorable outcome might occur to some of the parties if
the case goes to a jury.
Since the offender is supposed to be of primary concern, we shall start with
him to see who benefits in plea bargaining, and then proceed to the defense,
prosecution, police, and court personnel.
Being arrested and charged with an offense can be a very frustrating experience,
especially for first offenders. In view of time, lodging, humiliation, and the
possibility of being found guilty by a jury, there is great inducement to the accused
to seekoa bargain and speed by the process. First time offenders are probably more
idealistic about the system and tend to plead initially not guilty more than re-
peaters (Newman, 1970:174). They are also most likely to be represented by counsel.
This arrangement leaves them with more options in the bargaining process, and many
will change their pleas to guilty later as a part of the negotiation procedure.
Repeaters are most likely to plead guilty at first, but this does not mean that
they do not seek a bargain. Because of their past record, threats of the prosecution,
and fear of judges whom they may have seen before, repeaters need to be initially
more repentant to please the parties involved, or they simply want to "get it over"
more readily (Newman, 1970)174).
First-time offenders and repeaters often discover that even those representing
them are not particularly interested in spending time hearing their stories and
preparing detailed cases. Arthur S. Blumberg notes that many times "In his relations
with his counsel, the accused begins to experience his first sense of 'betrayal'"
(Blumberg, 1969:288). Not only is time short, but often the assumption of guilt
is already present. This is not the normal worker-client relationship. David
Sudnow's studies of the Public Defender indicate the same attitude (Sudnow, 1965:
255-276). The accused receives a short interview in which "The most important
70 Kansas Journal of Sociology
feature of the P.D. 's questioning is the presupposition of guilt ... " The attitude
Ls frequently C1You are guilty, now let's see what we can do' to make the best of
the situation." Some form of negotiation probably follows.
Blumberg's study reveals some of the common reasons by defendants who pleaded
guilty to justify what they did (Knudten, 1970:446).
PercentNature of Response
Defend~nt Responses As To Guilt or Innocence After Pleading (1962-4)
Number of
Defendants
Innocent
(Manipulated)
Innocent
(Pragmatic)
Innocent
(Advice of counse~)
Innocent
(Defiant)
Innocent
(Adverse social data)
Guilty
Guilty
Fatalistic
(Doesn't press his
"innocence," won't
admit guilt")
"The lawyer or judge, police or
DA 'conned me'"
"Wanted to get it over with"
"You can't beat the system"
"They have you over a barrel
when you have a record"
"Followed my lawyer's advice"
"Framed"--
Betrayed by "complainant,"
"police," "squealers,"
"lawyer," "friends," "wife,"
"girlfriend'"
Blames probation officer or
psychiatrist for "bad report"
in cases where there was
prepleading investigation
"But I should have gotten a
better deal"
Blames lawyer, DA, police,
judge
Won't say anything further
"I did it for convenience"
"My lawyer told me it was the
only thing I could do"
"I did it because it was the
best way out"
86
147
92
33
15
74
21
248
11.9
20.3
12.7
4.6
2.1
10.2
2.9
34.2
·No response
Total
8
724
1.1
100.0
Many offenders no doubt fear the consequences of a jury trial, and perhaps this
fear is heightened by attorneys in the case. In many cases, however, the accused
might fare better, with concerned representation, if he did go to a jury trial.
Evidence is scant on this point. The American Jury Study by Harry Kalvern, Jr.
and Hans Zeisel is one source which indicates that the defendant fares better in
a jury trial than a bench trial. They found the judge to be more lenient in
three percent of the cases and the jury to be more lenient in nineteen percent
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of the cases. "This means that in the cases which the defendant decides to bring
before the jury, on balance, he fares better 16 percent of the time than he would
have in a bench trial"(l969:372-373).
If the defendant were the only one to benefit from the plea bargain, the
system would probably not be entrenched to the degree that it is--other related
parties also benefit.
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The prosecutor is a strategic force in the court system, and he calls many
of the key plays concerning the offender. He decides what charges will be brought
against the accused, when the case will appear on the calendar, recommends the
amount of bail, what evidence will be used, and in many cases recommends the
sentence (Blumberg, 1969:282; also, President's Commission, 1968:333-334). In
some cases he may also recommend the judge who will hear the case. The prosecutor
has an integral part in the plea negotiation and is benefitted by a favorable
outcome. Blumberg states that the district attorney is "aggressively interested
in obtaining a negotiated plea rather than a case culminating in a combative trial"
(1969:282). One reason is that a case going to trial requires an elaborate procedure
and extensive preparation. Most prosecutors' offices cannot bear the cost, time,
or personnel to handle the majority of cases in this manner. Even more, the prose-
cutor wants to maintain control as much as possible over sentence and disposition.
By being assured of a guilty plea beforehand, he can also be confident that his
public image will be kept favorable and his "batting average" will remain high.
Successful convictions, even if on a lesser charge, are essential to a prosecutor's
career.
Judges are aware of the negotiated plea and also have something to gain by
its use. The President's Commission report says that "Inevitably the' judge plays
a part in the negotiated guilty plea." Both this report and the ABA Project on
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice emphasize, however that the judge should
not be an active participant in the discussions that lead to a plea agreement
(Task Force, 1967:12). The judge's vested interest is well summ~rized by Abraham
S. Blumberg.
He shares the prosecutor's earnest desire to avoid the time
consuming, expensive, unpredictable snares and pitfalls of
an adversary trial. He sees an impossible backlog ,of cases,
with their mounting delays, as possible evidence of his
"inefficiency" and failure. The defendant's plea of guilty
enables the judge to engage in a social-psychological
fantasy--the accused becomes an already repentant individual
who has "learned his lesson" and deserves lenient treatment
(1969:287).
There is some evidence to support the notion that some judges also hand out
less severe sentences to defendants who have negotiated for a guilty plea than
those who have been convicted by a jury trial for the same offense (Ohlin and
Remington, 1958:495-507).
We have mentioned only a few of the key persons'up to this point who might be
beneficiaries when plea bargaining is utilized. There are others not so directly
related. For example, we could mention police officers who like to see their
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efforts payoff with a guilty plea and conviction. Probation officers, politicians,
the victim, and others also have, some interest. But what about the general public
and the future status of the entire criminal system of justice?
Arguments lOr and Against Plea Bargaining
There is little doubt about our criminal courts' reliance on plea negotiation--
the system operates on that assumption. Many, however, see this reliance as" being
a tremendous threat to the system at large, while others see it as a step that
benefits the system and may even enhance it by wider use and official acceptance.
Others perhaps accept it out of necessity because of limited resources and are not
overly concerned.
Those who are against the use of the plea bargain see its acceptance as an
indication of a general 'disregard for law and the judicial process. They might
point out that it ~imits the range of punishment and limits the defendant's chance
for his case to be fully heard by a jury. This form of "copping a plea" might also
be taken advantage of by dangerous offenders who are able to manipulate prosecutors
or the courts through plea bargaining (Knudten, 1970:440). There also may be an
incentive for offenders to give false information in return for lenient consideration.
Or, on the reverse side'of the coin, the use of threats by the prosecutor or defending
attorney may "induce guilty pleas that are not justified or even on the innocent who
are the victims of expediency. Judges too are not exempt from the corruption that
accrues when they step beyond their legally prescribed duties to take part in plea
negotiation (President's Commission, 1968:335). Perhaps they would be more subject
to various types of political manipulation.
Arthur Rosett is one who is critical of the manner in which the system operates
behind the scenes;
The system itself does not recognize the legitimacy of plea-
negotiation, and usually the rules under which the game is
played insist that the defendant state in court at the time
the plea is entered that no promises have been made to induce
the plea. Yet, everyone in the courtroom, including the,
judge, the prosecutor, and the defendant's lawyer, knows the
negotiations have occurred, and the proceedings, therefore,
take on the air of a solemn charade (1971:438).
Opponents of the present system are plenty, but there is little likelihood that
the use of plea negotiation will be eliminated.
Supporters of negotiated pleas usually believe, or at least accept the fact,
that it is not essential" that most accused persons come before a jury to protect
their constitutional rights. Why go through a long and often tedious court trial
procedure when the accused offender is obviously guilty? The interests of both the
state and the defendant are served.
The President's Commission Report gave support to those who want the continuation
of the system, but it also emphasized that the system would have to be restructured
to safeguard citizens. "Plea negotiations can be conducted fairly and openly, can
be consistent with sound law enforcement policy, and can bring a worthwhile flexibi-
lity to the disposition of offenders"(l968:335). It serves practical functions and
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saves investments of time, talents, and money; and to abolish it would be to place
an overload on the courts to an extent that would not presently be feasible.
Numerous recommendations were made that " •.. are intended to convert the practice
of plea bargaining into a visible t forthright, and informed effort to reach sound
dispositional decisions" (Task Force, 1967:12). Among the most important are the
following:
Whenever the defendant faces a significant penalty, he
should be represented by counsel, whether the offense
is classified as a felony or a misdemeanor. The presence
of counsel helps ensure that the plea is reliable, that
the risks of litigation have been considered, and that no
unfair advantage has been taken of the defendant.
Prosecutors who practice plea bargaining should make the
·opportunity to negotiate equally available to all
defendants ••• the prosecutor should publish procedures
and standards, making clear his availability to confer
with counsel and listing the factors deemed relevant.
Discussions between prosecutor and defense counsel should
deal explicitly with dispositional questions and the
development of a correctional program for the offender.
The full and frank exchange of relevant information
regarding the offender and the offense .•. is equally
essential at this stage of the proceedings. When a
precharge conference has been held, the data assembled
by both parties may be used in the plea negotiations.
In addition procedures should be adopted which would
enable the parties to call upon the probation office
or some other factfinding agency to obtain what is in
effect a presentence investigation for use in the
negotiation discussions.
The negotiations should be freed from their present
irregular status so that the participants can frankly
acknowledge the negotiations and their agreement can
be reviewed by ·the judge and made a matter of record.
The judge's role is not that of one of the parties to the
negotiation, but that of an independent examiner to
verify that the defendant's plea is the result of an
intelligent and knowing choice. The judge should make
sure that the defendant understands the nature of the
charge, his right to trial, the consequences of his plea,
and the defenses available to him. The judge also should
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea, by
specific inquiry of the prosecutor, the defendant, his
counsel, or witnesses, or by consideration of other
evidence.
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Only if the judge is satisfied that these criteria have
been met should he indicate that the disposition is
acceptab1e.to him. Provisions must be made for situations
in which the judge finds the agreement unacceptable and in
which the case is set for trial (Task Force, 1967:12-13).
Sununary
.~
Bargain-justice has become a necessity in our present criminal court system.
As a result, most criminal cases do not go to jury trial but end in a guilty plea
and a bench trial. Plea bargaining is present in a substantial number of cases.
A recent Federal Court of Appeals decision noted: "In a sense, it can be said
that most guilty pleas are the result of a "bargain" with the prosecution"
(Cortes vs. United States, 1964). Plea negotiation, however, has never gained
an official recognition and continues to be cloaked with suspicion and hypocrisy.
Indications are that the bargaining aspect of criminal proceedings will
continue to endure inspite of opponents who fear its existence w'ill create a
shambles of the justice system. It will continue because of a lack of funds,
time, personnel, and interest. Moreover, it will endure because many if not
all of the parties directly involved with the. cases benefit in a variety of
ways from the use of negotiation. The defendant, the defending attorney, the
prosecutor, the judge, policemen--all have a vested interest in a guilty plea
and expedient justice.
The future, then, most likely will see a change in the system and not a
removal of plea bargaining. The recommendations of the President's Commission
o~ Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice are a healthy sign of the
kind of changes that would make plea negotiation a more visible and forthright
procedure. And as the Federal Court of Appeals further noted:
The important thing is not that there shall be no
"deal" or "bargain," but that the plea shall be a
genuine one, by a defendant who· is guilty; one who
understands his situation, his rights, and the
consequences of the plea, and is neither deceived
nor coerced (Cortes vs. United States, 1964). .
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